Every manager concedes that there is a need for protection. The mixed can of cobras and boa constrictors that this concession opens is the question: how much protection and under what conditions?
Agreement is strongest when protection and production are mutually successful. The best protection is the most productive in the long term. In the short term the implementation of protection often produces conflict. Sometimes protection takes time to show its benefits. However, once protection shows benefits, aggressive managers sometimes discover a new tool, machine or method to exploit to enhance production.
It is the safety person’s delight every time protection turns out to be productive and the production can be demonstrated and confirmed. Loss control’s downside occurs at the point at which the protective feature isoverexploited for production. Consider two historic examples.
Sacrificing safety
There was enormous improvement in miner health and safety that followed the introduction of the Davy safety lamp. Checking for explosive mixtures of gas before the Davy lamp was life threatening. A miner was wrapped in wet leather and proceeded into the suspect area with a lighted candle on the end of a pole. This miner was called a “fireman.” The very nature of the “safety” check for the explosive mixture introduced the spark (flame) for disaster.
The Davy lamp alternative put the test flame inside a wire mesh and a glass cylinder. A change in the flame indicated a change in flammable gas mixture. This opened the active mining area into here-to-for abandoned areas. The push for coal, with the benefit of the safety device, went beyond the margin of safety and miners got killed with the aid and comfort of a safety device. The protective device, when abused in the push for production, became the trigger for a hazard to turn loose its mayhem.
A second example of a protective device becoming a hazard multiplier is radar. Ships from time immemorial were challenged by fog and congestion in harbors, bays and at sea. Radar made it possible for ships to travel faster in crowded or weather-downgraded seaways. The protective gain of radar warning of other ships and hazards in the area was pushed beyond a reasonable protective minimum. Faster and closer changed into too fast and too close.
James Reason in his book, “Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents,” after describing these two examples proceeds to a clean, hard comment.
“In short, protective gains are frequently converted into protective advantages, leaving the organization with the same inadequate protection that prevailed before the event or with something even worse. The incidence of mine explosions increased dramatically in the years following the introduction of the Davy lamp, and the history of marine accidents is littered with radar-assisted collisions(emphasis added).” What a priceless description: radar-assisted collisions.
Two-edged improvement
There aren’t any Davy lamps in surface quarries and to date no one is using radar in the pits to locate loaders and haul trucks. However, one protective, productive improvement in the pit can be two edged. Consider haul roads. Well-graded and drained haul roads keep operators from bouncing around in the cab and reduce maintenance on the trucks. Well-maintained roads also accommodate increased speeds. Someone has to evaluate and maintain the balance between improved roads (protection) with optimum speeds (production).
There is a name for this phenomenon of taking more risk when hazards are reduced or a protective measure is introduced. Some authors call this risk compensation; others call it risk homeostasis. An everyday familiar example or question is, do people drive faster because they are wearing seat belts in their cars? Oddly enough, considering the length of time the question has been around, it remains inadequately answered.
